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Assessment
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Africa Review

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Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010032-5

AFRICA REVIEW (U)

15 December 1978

CONTENTS

Angola: UNITA vs. the Benguela Railroad (U) 1

The reopening of the Benguela Railroad is being jeopardized by political, economic, technical, organizational, and logistic problems, any one of which could prevent an early return to efficient operations. (C)

Ghana: Six Months To Go (U) 6

Ghana, which has experienced various forms of civilian and military rule with generally disappointing results during 20 years of political and economic malaise is scheduled to change over to an interim civilian government in July 1979. (C)

Botswan: The Dynamics of Succession (U). 12

The war in Rhodesia has increasingly threatened the political and economic stability that has been fostered in Botswan by President Seretse Khama. (U)

Chad: Reconciliation Still Shaky (U). 16

Chad's shaky government of "national union" formed last August is still far from ending the country's Muslim insurgency. (C)

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010032-5

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010032-5

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Angola: UNITA vs. the Benguela Railroad (U)

The reopening of the Benguela Railroad--announced last month--is jeopardized by myriad political, economic, technical, organizational, and logistic problems, any one of which could prevent an early return to efficient operations. In addition to these problems, an even more important question will be the extent to which the insurgents of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) maintain or increase their attacks on the vulnerable rail line. [REDACTED]

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The Benguela reportedly is in generally good condition and an attempt to begin operations along the entire 1,347 kilometer route is expected soon. In recent weeks, however, representatives of the UNITA insurgents--a force numbering approximately 18,000--have stated repeatedly that they will escalate their attacks. We have no reason to doubt either their intentions or their capability. Even as the repairs on the major bridge at Dilolo were being completed in October, UNITA continued to sabotage other sections of the line, demonstrating that it is able to attack portions of the railroad almost at will. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] UNITA probably believes that its credibility both with Luanda and with its outside supporters rests largely on its ability to prevent the railroad from operating. The insurgents are concerned that the Angolan Government's continuing diplomatic gestures toward the West are aimed in part at putting pressure on UNITA. They may have decided to respond by stepping up their attacks on the rail line so as to demonstrate that they remain a force to be reckoned with. [REDACTED]

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15 December 1978

25X1 The insurgents' attacks over the last two years have been numerous, but most have been relatively minor hit-and-run raids aimed primarily at causing derailments, destroying track, and blowing up small bridges. With a few exceptions, most of the damage inflicted by these raids could be repaired within 48 hours. In late October, however, UNITA reportedly destroyed two bridges that may close the railroad for several weeks. The guerrillas also may attempt to inflict greater damage on the Benguela if they see a substantial increase in traffic on the line or if they believe they are becoming isolated from their traditional sources of external diplomatic or material support. [REDACTED]

UNITA will maintain the capability to harass the railroad--especially in those areas where it has tribal and popular support. We believe that at present UNITA has the men and materiel to survive as an effective guerrilla force against the railroad even without substantial external assistance. Contrary to what Angolan President Neto has publicly alleged, the insurgents are not dependent on outside assistance or sanctuary from Angola's neighbors to maintain their attacks against the line, and they apparently have stockpiles of military supplies inside Angola. [REDACTED]

UNITA does not have to destroy the railroad completely to keep it from operating effectively. Frequent minor damage, the threat of sabotage that causes the Angolans to run trains at less than normal speed, and the need for the Angolans to check the line in advance and to scout the surrounding terrain will greatly impede the Benguela's usefulness. [REDACTED]

Security Measures

The Angolan Government will be hard pressed to provide adequate security for the rail line. In addition to posting guards and building fortifications at major bridges, an armored ore car manned by Angolan troops is run in front of each train. Helicopters and spotter aircraft also are flown along the route. There may be as many as a few thousand Angolan troops guarding the line, with work gangs stationed at various points to make repairs caused by UNITA activity. The Angolan Government intends to reinforce its defenses along the rail line, but these measures are unlikely to reduce UNITA's capacity to conduct sabotage. [REDACTED]

15 December 1978

Luanda has attempted to extract a commitment from Kinshasa to assist with security along the Angolan section of the line, presumably by using Zairian military personnel. Zaire reportedly refused, but each country then agreed to "guarantee circulation and security" within its respective territory. Although Kinshasa has been less than enthusiastic in preparing for the reopening of the railway, the Zairian portion of the line should be secure--at least as long as the Inter-African Force remains in Shaba. [REDACTED]

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Impact on Zaire and Zambia

Although Kinshasa and Lusaka have reacted positively to Luanda's decision last August to reopen the railroad, neither President Mobutu nor President Kaunda believes that the Angolan Government can ensure the security of the route. Both believe that UNITA will not allow the Benguela to operate until Angolan President Neto agrees to negotiate with the insurgents. [REDACTED]

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15 December 1978

In the short to medium term, the railroad probably will have little increased economic significance for Angola, Zambia, or Zaire. Nor will Zambia and Zaire attempt to adjust their transport routes until Angola is able to demonstrate that the railroad is secure.* For the present, Zaire's and now Zambia's most important route to the outside is the rail line to the south, through Zambia, Rhodesia, and Botswana to South African ports. Loss of this access route would put heavy pressure on Zaire and Zambia to look again to the Benguela.

Increased UNITA attacks on the line could lead Neto to blame the Zairians--or the Zambians--for aiding the rebels and to insist that they put pressure on Savimbi to curtail the attacks. UNITA activities against the Benguela Railroad therefore have the potential of jeopardizing the recent progress made in easing tensions between Angola and Zaire.

Outlook

There is little doubt that UNITA could put the railroad out of action if it chose to do so. Angolan officials undoubtedly are concerned over the vulnerability of bridges in the Cubal Variant area which, if destroyed, would take many months to rebuild. Even though some of the spans may be guarded by Angolan troops, UNITA has the capability of mounting effective operations in this area.

We do not believe that Angolan troops will be able to protect the line, much of which runs through UNITA--occupied territory.

*Until 1975, Zaire and landlocked Zambia used the Benguela Railroad to transport more than half of their vital copper exports to Angola's Atlantic port of Lobito. Zaire's copper industry in Shaba Region also depended heavily on the line for imports of equipment that were necessary to keep the mines working efficiently. (U)

15 December 1978

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
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In sum, it is unlikely that Benguela Railroad operations can be restored to the pre - civil war level until the Angolan Government either reaches a modus vivendi with UNITA or is able to defeat UNITA militarily, neither of which appears likely over the short term.

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15 December 1978

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Ghana: Six Months To Go (U)

Ghana, which has experienced various forms of civilian and military rule with generally disappointing results during 20 years of political and economic malaise, is scheduled to change over to an "interim" civilian government in July 1979. This administration is supposed to rule for no more than four years while decisions are made on what "permanent" form of government and constitution will best help the country overcome its longstanding difficulties. 

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In 1957, when Ghana became the first country in black Africa to win independence from European colonialism, it seemed to offer a model for emergent Africa with high hopes for parliamentary democracy and economic vitality. It was the spokesman for African unity and liberation, and aspired to build a modern industrial state that would dominate all of Africa. Today Ghana is a prime example to other Africans of their elusive quest for political stability and their economic dependence on Western donor countries and institutions. 

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Ghana labors under the heritage of internal antagonisms and economic ruin bequeathed by its first President, the late Kwame Nkrumah, who was ousted by the Army in 1966. Nkrumah oriented Ghana toward the Communist world, burdened it with some \$1 billion in external debt, and moved from parliamentary democracy to one-man rule. Parliamentary democracy was restored by the military in 1969 under the late Prime Minister Busia, Nkrumah's historic rival, who tied Ghana closely to the West. Unpopular economic recovery measures resulted in a coup in 1972 by General Acheampong. Acheampong's generally Western-oriented regime soon abandoned serious economic reform and eventually brought the country through mismanagement to the brink of collapse. Acheampong was ousted last July by General Akuffo's firmly pro-Western government. 

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15 December 1978

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Ghana's central problem has been its failure to settle on a workable political system that will also foster economic recovery and thus offer hope of lasting more than a few years. As Ghanaians continue to grope for stability, there is no sign that they will opt for a drastic solution to the country's ills, such as some sort of radical socioeconomic-political restructuring. Ghana today is one of Africa's relatively few moderate, pro-Western countries where capitalism and fairly democratic procedures seem deeply embedded. The emergence of a radical left-wing regime does not seem likely at present, although there is a current of African socialist thought among some politicians, academics, journalists, and trade unionists. []

Two decades of instability are rooted in long-established Ghanaian patterns of behavior, attitudes, and values that are difficult to change. Politics tends to be a winner-take-all, grab-what-you-can game. The concept of democratic opposition is distrusted, and long-range planning takes second seat. The extended family social system militates against individual responsibility and discipline and encourages corruption and nepotism. The parochial forces of tribalism and regionalism, though less severe than in some countries, also work against the nation-building process. []

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The Akuffo Regime Six Months Later

General Akuffo's caretaker regime is struggling to guide Ghana back to responsible elected civilian government and to implement a painful retrenchment program aimed at laying the groundwork for future economic recovery. Despite its best efforts, the six-month-old government has failed to overcome the mismanagement, waste, and corruption that caused the downfall of Acheampong. The lack of marked improvement in the government's performance and continued severe inflation and shortages of essential commodities have further eroded popular confidence. The regime's call for greater civilian discipline and sacrifice necessary for economic reform is meeting with growing skepticism. Still, the Akuffo government seems capable of hanging on long enough to transfer power to civilians next July as scheduled. []

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15 December 1978

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Civilian Rule Plan Modified

The military government's chances for remaining in power were boosted significantly late last month when it gave in to widespread popular pressure by agreeing that Ghana's interim future civilian government would be based on political parties. General Akuffo had sincerely believed that civilians--without parties--would be better able to avoid divisive politics and concentrate on more rational political and economic planning for the future. The civilian elite, which strongly favors party politics and is eager for another turn at power, now has a more vested interest in the survival of the Akuffo regime. Ghana's military rulers have now abandoned the last vestiges of General Acheampong's unique "union government" proposal, which would have excluded political parties and provided for a sharing of power between civilians and the military. [REDACTED]

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Because of popular disillusionment with the military, the regime is eager to return to the barracks but in the time left reportedly will strive to encourage responsible political leadership on the part of civilians. Regime leaders remain wary of a return to the divisive party politicking that undermined previous civilian governments and are likely to push hard behind the scenes for some sort of a united front government, perhaps to the extent of supporting those politicians willing to back this goal. General Akuffo has publicly declared that Ghana's future government must be a broad-based coalition involving all major parties. According to a top spokesman, the government plans to inform emergent party leaders of the need for a government of national unity, the depth of Ghana's economic problems, and the advisability of keeping politics out of current economic reform plans. [REDACTED]

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The military will be watching carefully for indications during campaigning that civilian aspirants plan to probe the finances of officers previously posted to the government or to reduce substantially the size of the armed forces. Regime leaders may offer to support leading politicians if they promise to avoid taking such actions. Lower ranking officers, if their fear of civilian probing or demobilization is seriously heightened, could try to pressure the government to postpone civilian rule or even attempt a coup. [REDACTED]

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15 December 1978

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A constituent assembly began meeting in mid-December to approve a constitution for Ghana's interim civilian government. Recently elected local district councils will each appoint one member to serve in the assembly. A constitutional drafting commission has recommended a government with separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Such a government would have an elected president, a 140-member parliament, and a council of state to advise the president and legislature. The military would not have a role in the government. []

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The Political Party Scene

Although the formal ban on political party activity will be lifted on 1 January, there has been considerable behind-the-scenes politicking for the past year and a half. Because reconstituted old parties will not be allowed to campaign under their former names, a large number of political parties will probably emerge. Political jockeying in the months ahead, however, is likely to reduce the number to a few major parties. Few new politicians are evident on the scene, and the country is still generally divided along the lines of the old Nkrumah and Busia political groupings. Nkrumah's Convention People's Party and Busia's Progress Party are today badly factionalized and torn by leadership struggles. Both originally were disparate groups that cut across tribal, age, and other political lines. The Progress Party did draw considerable support in rural areas, particularly in the Akan-speaking areas, the home of Ghana's numerically largest cluster of tribes. []

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Adherents of the former Progress Party, which appears to have the best countrywide organization, won a large majority of local district council seats in nationwide elections last month. These election results may not be a reliable guide to party strengths, however, given the low voter turnout. Victor Owusu, Busia's Foreign Minister, and J. H. Mensah are the chief rivals for party leadership, although the former seems to have the best chance of emerging as the party's presidential contender. Nkrumah's old party appears to be coalescing around Dr. Imoru Egala, Nkrumah's Minister of Industries. []

15 December 1978

A. M. Issifu, the secretary general of the 500,000 member Ghana Trades Union Congress, may be considering organizing a major labor-based party along socialist lines as an alternative to the country's old parties and leaders.

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Organized labor may in the end ally with one or another of the major parties or opt for supporting individual candidates who are favorable to labor interests.

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The Economic Situation

The Akuffo government has passed its first severe test on the economic front. A state of emergency in effect since last November has stopped for now a wave of strikes for higher wages. Despite its tough stance, the government has agreed to negotiate for pay raises through established arbitration channels. It is unclear how much deficit spending will be necessary to meet minimum labor demands. Substantially increased expenditures could seriously set back Ghana's new program of economic retrenchment and stabilization. These policies are necessary both for obtaining large standby loans from the International Monetary Fund and other Western creditors and for longer term political stability. Two factors in the government's favor are the continued high world price of cocoa, Ghana's main export, and the prospect of an early harvest that promise to bring sizable earnings.

Ghana has reached agreement in principle with the International Monetary Fund, but faces a continued need to keep a tight lid on further labor unrest and expenditures. It must also reduce the overseas value of Ghana's currency, already devalued by more than 50 percent since last summer. The government could face another serious crunch before Ghana's economic policies and the draft standby agreement are given final approval by the International Monetary Fund.

The schedule of negotiations does not leave much time to get Ghana's economic reform policies firmly under way before the scheduled changeover to civilian rule in July 1979. Ghana's future civilian leaders may not have

15 December 1978

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
the political will to implement these difficult policies. Even if they do, the task of bringing discipline to the management of the economy is likely to require three to five years or more.

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15 December 1978

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Botswana: The Dynamics of Succession (U)

The war in Rhodesia has increasingly threatened the political and economic stability that has been fostered in Botswana by President Seretse Khama. Further, the country will be faced with difficult problems as a seemingly inevitable struggle for majority rule in South Africa approaches. This is an initial look at Khama's style of operation, the impact of the situation in South Africa and Rhodesia on that style, and a tentative examination of the prospects for the future should Khama, whose health seems somewhat uncertain, suddenly depart the scene. (U)

Khama's withdrawal from Botswanan political life could have a serious destabilizing effect on a country that by African standards has been remarkably free of political ferment since independence in 1966. Largely through his ties to, and support from, the largest tribe in Botswana, the Bamangwato, Khama has dominated Botswanan politics. He has ruled through a combination of modern parliamentary and traditional methods and heads one of the few relatively democratic governments in Africa. Through his efforts, the government's economic development program has made more progress than many observers thought possible at independence. Khama has also been able to steer a careful course between the international political pressures brought about by Botswana's position as one of the five Front Line states and the counterpressures resulting from the economic strangle-hold that Rhodesia and South Africa have on his country. (U)

Nevertheless, the growing racial tensions in southern Africa are beginning to cause political and racial stresses within Botswana. There is increasing antipathy among Botswanans over the white expatriates who reside in the country; expatriates fill roughly 60 percent of the senior administrative and professional posts in the government. Last August, Vice President Quett Masire lashed out against what he considered white expatriate support for the white regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. He

15 December 1978

SECRET

warned that "any white farmer in Botswana who has sympathies for the enemies of Botswana should pack up and get out or risk suffering the consequences of his disloyalty and ingratitude." In addition, violence in neighboring countries such as Rhodesia, which has resulted in periodic border incidents, has led to calls on the government to take extralegal measures, such as arming the civilian population and organizing vigilante groups. [REDACTED]

Botswana has also become a haven for political refugees from Rhodesia and South Africa. It is not yet clear what, if any, impact the thousands of refugees in Botswana who have no stake in traditional Botswanan political life might have. As the war in Rhodesia continues and external and internal pressures for change in South Africa mount, a growing number of these refugees may remain permanently in the country and could become a serious problem. Their presence could help politicize Botswanan youth and detribalized city dwellers. There are some signs of restiveness among these Botswanan groups, which would like to see Botswana assume a more militant posture against the South African and Rhodesian Governments. [REDACTED]

Over the years, internal stresses have been kept in check by Khama, largely because of the stature that he enjoys both at home and abroad. Without the steadying and moderate style of leadership that Khama has displayed, it is questionable whether Botswana will continue along the general moderate and Western-oriented course that Khama has sought to chart for his country. [REDACTED]

The Succession

The 55-year-old Khama has long suffered from a host of health problems. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The constitution provides that if the President dies or if the Chief Justice determines that he is physically or mentally incapacitated, the Vice President is to assume the office. [REDACTED]

15 December 1978

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[redacted] He seems to be Khama's choice as a successor. Masire has concurrently been Minister of Finance and Development Planning since 1966 and is considered an excellent administrator. He is largely untested in the area of foreign affairs, however, although he has represented Khama at meetings of the Front Line states. He is neither a member of the royal family, nor of the traditionally important Bamangwato tribe, two factors that might affect his effort to ensure an orderly transition. [redacted]

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It is unclear at this point how effectively Masire would be able to deal with the disparate internal and external pressures that might arise should Khama pass from the scene. In the short term, the few minuscule parties that comprise the political opposition would probably not pose a great threat to Masire. They are led by detribalized political leaders who have attracted little popular support and have few ties to the traditional bases of support that have enabled Khama to rule successfully over the years. [redacted]

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Khama's Son

Except for Masire, there seems to be a dearth of notable figures on the political scene who look like potential contenders for power. There is some speculation, however, that Khama's 25-year-old son, Brigadier Ian Khama, deputy commander of the Botswanan Defense Force, might figure in the post-Khama era. Although his youth and political inexperience may work against his chances of achieving a top leadership position in the near future, he does appear to be politically ambitious. [redacted]

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
In November 1977, Ian Khama became chief-designate of the Bamangwato tribe, which has given him ties to an important group whose support will be important to a future government, particularly in a transition period. He has not yet been formally installed, however, and seems to be in no hurry to assume his responsibilities as chief. He has left the daily administration of the tribe to others while he has concentrated on his military duties. Thus far, Ian Khama has not made any efforts to build a political base among the Bamangwato, nor has he indicated that he intends to use the chieftainship to familiarize himself with the grass-roots political and social problems that face Botswana. [redacted]


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15 December 1978


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Khama's style of leadership and the moderate policies he has advocated seem to have set the tone for an orderly succession. Khama's successor will, however, have to contend with several problems which could have a seriously destabilizing effect on Botswana. Following Khama's departure, pressures from other African and Third World countries for Botswana to provide more support for efforts aimed against the South African Government will almost certainly increase. The country's continuing economic dependence on South Africa will require the leader of a post-Khama government to walk an even more precarious tightrope between fulfilling the country's role as a Front Line state without alienating the South African Government.* 

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Majority rule in Rhodesia is likely to increase pressure on Botswana to provide more support for international coercive action against South Africa. Should Khama's successor be unable to resist outside demands for a more militant posture against South Africa, Pretoria could impose drastic measures that would seriously affect the Botswanan economy. A future Botswana Government could also be subject to military reprisals from South Africa if, in response to outside pressure, it opens the country to insurgents seeking to operate against South Africa. 

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*As an example of the degree to which South Africa controls Botswana's economy, the government receives 36 percent of its revenues through its membership in the South African Customs Union.

15 December 1978

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Chad: Reconciliation Still Shaky (U)

25X1 Chad's shaky government of "national union" formed in late August is still far from ending the country's protracted Muslim insurgency. The principal figures in the new government--President Felix Malloum and Prime Minister and former rebel leader Hissein Habre--do not trust each other and disagree on almost every issue, resulting in a virtual paralysis of the government. The ill feeling between the two leaders limits prospects for success of the reconciliation movement, which depends largely on how well Malloum is able to balance the need for a meaningful northern role in the government against southern fears of losing control to the former Muslim insurgents. [REDACTED]

At the same time, both leaders realize it is in their interests to keep things going. Habre lacks popular support, particularly in Christian-dominated southern Chad, to set up his own government, while Malloum is under heavy pressure from the French Government, his principal benefactor, which is anxious to reduce its military commitment in Chad. Habre and Malloum are also aware of the growing influence of gendarmerie commander Kamougue, who lost his position as Foreign Minister when the new government was formed. Kamougue, a bitter opponent of the Muslim rebels and longtime foe of Habre, could step in if the situation deteriorates. Finally, Malloum needs some Muslim participation if he is to have any chance of gaining support of the major rebel group led by Toubou chieftain Goukouni, which occupies more than half of the country and is supported by Libya. [REDACTED]

An Inauspicious Beginning

The new government spent the first six weeks or so filling ministerial and senior staff positions and carrying out some of the less contentious provisions of the Khartoum agreement--signed last August under Sudanese auspices--that promised broader Muslim participation in the traditionally southern-dominated national government.

15 December 1978

25X1 Malloum's Supreme Military Council and Habre's Northern Armed Forces Command were dissolved, members were appointed to a 16-man defense and security committee, and a consultative body--the National Union Council--was established. Ministerial and senior staff positions were filled and publication began of official correspondence in both Arabic and French. [REDACTED]

Little else has been done, however, and the bureaucracy has been buffeted by rumors of sweeping personnel changes and a massive reorganization. Many middle-level positions--particularly those allocated by Habre's followers--remain unfilled because of the lack of qualified people. Most officials on duty are reluctant to make decisions and pass the authority for even routine questions to the senior level. A marked contrast is Kamougue's smooth takeover of the national gendarmerie which is being rapidly upgraded into an effective military force. [REDACTED]

This confusion and inertia have been exacerbated in recent weeks by rising tension between Malloum and Habre after the latter insisted that all remaining provisions of the reconciliation accord be implemented immediately. Malloum prefers a more deliberate approach, especially in integrating Muslims into the armed forces and reorganizing security and other government organizations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15 December 1978

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The tension between the two leaders eased early last month after a quick visit to Ndjamena by a senior Sudanese official who has been involved in previous mediation efforts. The latest truce, concluded just before Malloum left on an aid-seeking mission to Paris, calls for a discussion of all outstanding issues except that of political prisoners. Given France's support for a unified Chadian Government, Malloum may have felt the French would be reluctant to meet his aid requests unless he and Habre ended their confrontation. [REDACTED]

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As things turned out, Malloum came away with French assurances of continued support [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] agreed to keep its estimated 2,000-man combat force in Chad for now and to revamp its military training program. In addition, France will provide increased budgetary support, making it Ndjamena's largest single source of revenue. Paris also plans to expand its medical and educational assistance programs in response to Malloum's decision to replace a 29-man Soviet medical team and Moscow's subsequent cancellation of plans for the return of some 60 Soviet teachers, doctors, and other technicians still on summer vacation. Malloum has long complained that Moscow requires Ndjamena to pay too much for Soviet help. [REDACTED]

In return for the French commitments, Malloum agreed to expedite the release of political prisoners--an amnesty was extended in late November but did not apply to former associates of Habre--and to allocate half the slots for overseas military training to Habre appointees. French officials also urged the President to step up efforts to recruit followers of rebel leader Goukouni and to advertise more the Malloum-Habre reconciliation through joint tours of the country. [REDACTED]

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The Military Situation

Ndjamena's search for a political settlement has been greatly assisted by the relatively quiet military front. Fighting has been almost at a standstill since last spring when the insurgents broke off their offensive after two major defeats by French and Chadian troops. Some rebel groups have recently carried out small-scale attacks in the central part of the country and around

15 December 1978

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Lake Chad, during which government forces apparently performed remarkably well. Elsewhere, rebel units have not ventured away from their bases. Nevertheless, official concern over rebel intentions remains high, and some provincial government functionaries have retired to safer ground in Ndjamena and elsewhere. [REDACTED]

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15 December 1978

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